Cessna 441 Conquest

Historical safety data and incident record for the Cessna 441 Conquest aircraft.

Safety Rating

9.8/10

Total Incidents

42

Total Fatalities

99

Incident History

June 29, 2025 6 Fatalities

Meander Air

February 7, 2021 3 Fatalities

BCD Aviation

Winchester Tennessee

On February 7, 2021, about 1648 central standard time, a Cessna 441, N44776, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Belvidere, Tennessee. The airline transport pilot and a commercial pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to preliminary radar and communications information obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration, the pilot took off from Thomasville Regional Airport (TVI), Thomasville, Georgia about 1527 with a destination of Winchester Municipal Airport (BGF), Winchester, Tennessee. As the airplane was descending to 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot established contact with the Bowling Green, Kentucky radar controller. The flight was then cleared for the RNAV runway 36 approach. As the airplane descended through 2,300 ft, the radar target disappeared, which was normal due to the radar coverage in the area. About 3 minutes later, the controller attempted to contact the pilot with no response. There was no further communication with the pilot. Later that evening, the wreckage was found about 6 miles south of BGF. The wreckage path was about 500 ft in length, and oriented on a northerly heading. A large portion of the fuselage and both wings were consumed by a postimpact fire.

November 18, 2018 3 Fatalities

Bismarck Air Medical

Harmon North Dakota

The pilot and two medical crewmembers were repositioning the airplane to pick up a patient for aeromedical transport. Dark night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight. Radar data showed the airplane climb to 14,000 ft mean sea level after departure and proceed direct toward the destination airport before beginning a right descending turn. The airplane subsequently broke up inflight and impacted terrain. No distress calls were received from the pilot before the accident. Although weather conditions were conducive for inflight icing, no evidence of structural icing was identified at the scene. The debris field was 2,500 ft long and the disbursement of the wreckage confirmed that both wings, the horizontal stabilizer, both elevators, and both engines separated from the airplane before impacting the ground. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the initiating failure was the failure of the wing where it passed through the center of the airplane. The three wing spars exhibited S-bending deformation, indicative of positive overload producing compressive buckling and fracture. Further, impact signatures as black paint transfers and gouged aluminum, were consistent with the left outboard wing separating when it was struck by the right engine after the wing spars failed. There was no evidence of any pre-exiting conditions that would have degraded the strength of the airplane structure at the fracture locations. Flight control continuity was confirmed. An examination of the engines, propellers, and available systems showed no mechanical malfunctions or failure that could have contributed to the accident. The descending right turn was inconsistent with the intended flight track and ATC-provided clearance. However, there was insufficient information to determine how it was initiated and when the pilot became aware of the airplane's state in the dark night IMC conditions. Yet, the absence of a distress call or communication with ATC about the airplane's deviation suggests that the pilot was not initially aware of the change in state. The structural failure signatures on the airplane were indicative of the wings failing in positive overload, which was consistent with the pilot initiating a pullup maneuver that exceeded the airplane spars' structural integrity during an attempted recovery from the spiral dive.

February 22, 2018 3 Fatalities

Ponderosa Aviation

Rossville Indiana

The airline transport pilot and two passengers departed in the twin-engine, pressurized airplane on a business flight in night instrument meteorological conditions. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane began to deviate from its assigned altitude and course. The controller queried the pilot, who responded that the airplane was "… a little out of control." After regaining control of the airplane, the pilot reported that he had experienced a "trim issue." The airplane continued on course and, about 13 minutes later, the pilot again reported a trim malfunction and said that he was having difficulty controlling the airplane. The flight's heading and altitude began to deviate from the course for the last 8 minutes of radar data and became more erratic for the last 2 minutes of radar data; radar and radio communication were subsequently lost at an altitude of about 18,300 ft in the vicinity of the accident site. Several witnesses reported hearing the airplane flying overhead. They all described the airplane as being very loud and that the engine sound was continuous up until they heard the impact. The airplane impacted a field in a relatively level attitude at high speed. The wreckage was significantly fragmented and the wreckage path extended about 1/4 mile over several fields. Examination of the available airframe and engine components revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The accident airplane was equipped with elevator, rudder, and aileron trim systems; however, not all components of the trim system and avionics were located or in a condition allowing examination. Although the airplane was equipped with an electric elevator trim and autopilot that could both be turned off in an emergency, the investigation could not determine which trim system the pilot was reportedly experiencing difficulties with. It is likely that the pilot was unable to maintain control of the airplane as he attempted to address the trim issues that he reported to air traffic control.

May 30, 2017 3 Fatalities

Rossair Charter

Renmark South Australia

On 30 May 2017, a Cessna 441 Conquest II (Cessna 441), registered VH-XMJ (XMJ) and operated by AE Charter, trading as Rossair, departed Adelaide Airport, South Australia for a return flight via Renmark Airport, South Australia. On board the aircraft were: • an inductee pilot undergoing a proficiency check, flying from the front left control seat • the chief pilot conducting the proficiency check, and under assessment for the company training and checking role for Cessna 441 aircraft, seated in the front right control seat • a Civil Aviation Safety Authority flying operations inspector (FOI), observing and assessing the flight from the first passenger seat directly behind the left hand pilot seat. Each pilot was qualified to operate the aircraft. There were two purposes for the flight. The primary purpose was for the FOI to observe the chief pilot conducting an operational proficiency check (OPC), for the purposes of issuing him with a check pilot approval on the company’s Cessna 441 aircraft. The second purpose was for the inductee pilot, who had worked for Rossair previously, to complete an OPC as part of his return to line operations for the company. The three pilots reportedly started their pre-flight briefing at around 1300 Central Standard Time. There were two parts of the briefing – the FOI’s briefing to the chief pilot, and the chief pilot’s briefing to the inductee pilot. As the FOI was not occupying a control seat, he was monitoring and assessing the performance of the chief pilot in the conduct of the OPC. There were two distinct exercises listed for the flight (see the section titled Check flight sequences). Flight exercise 1 detailed that the inductee pilot was to conduct an instrument departure from Adelaide Airport, holding pattern and single engine RNAV2 approach, go around and landing at Renmark Airport. Flight exercise 2 included a normal take-off from Renmark Airport, simulated engine failure after take-off, and a two engine instrument approach on return to Adelaide. The aircraft departed from Adelaide at 1524, climbed to an altitude about 17,000 ft above mean sea level, and was cleared by air traffic control (ATC) to track to waypoint RENWB, which was the commencement of the Renmark runway 073 RNAV-Z GNSS approach. The pilot of XMJ was then cleared to descend, and notified ATC that they intended to carry out airwork in the Renmark area. The pilot further advised that they would call ATC again on the completion of the airwork, or at the latest by 1615. No further transmissions from XMJ were recorded on the area frequency and the aircraft left surveillance coverage as it descended towards waypoint RENWB. The common traffic advisory frequency used for air-to-air communications in the vicinity of Renmark Airport recorded several further transmissions from XMJ as the crew conducted practice holding patterns, and a practice runway 07 RNAV GNSS approach. Voice analysis confirmed that the inductee pilot made the radio transmissions, as expected for the check flight. At the completion of the approach, the aircraft circled for the opposite runway and landed on runway 25, before backtracking and lining up for departure. That sequence varied from the planned exercise in that no single-engine go-around was conducted prior to landing at Renmark. At 1614, the common traffic advisory frequency recorded a transmission from the pilot of XMJ stating that they would shortly depart Renmark using runway 25 to conduct further airwork in the circuit area of the runway. A witness at the airport reported that, prior to the take-off roll, the aircraft was briefly held stationary in the lined-up position with the engines operating at significant power. The take-off roll was described as normal however, and the witness looked away before the aircraft became airborne. The aircraft maintained the runway heading until reaching a height of between 300-400 ft above the ground (see the section titled Recorded flight data). At that point the aircraft began veering to the right of the extended runway centreline (Figures 1 and 15). The aircraft continued to climb to about 600 ft above the ground (700 ft altitude), and held this height for about 30 seconds, followed by a descent to about 500 ft (Figures 2 and 13). The information ceased 5 seconds later, which was about 60 seconds after take-off. A distress beacon broadcast was received by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre and passed on to ATC at 1625. Following an air and ground search the aircraft was located by a ground party at 1856 about 4 km west of Renmark Airport. All on board were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

November 9, 2015 2 Fatalities

Legal Airways

Climax Georgia

The purpose of the flight was for the commercial pilot/owner to pick up passengers at the destination airport and return to the departure airport. The airplane was 33 miles from its destination in cruise flight at 3,300 ft mean sea level (msl) and above a solid cloud layer when the pilot declared to air traffic control (ATC) that he had the destination airport "in sight" and cancelled his instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance. During the 13 minutes after cancellation of the IFR clearance, the airplane's radar track made an erratic sequence of left, right, and 360° turns that moved the airplane away from the destination airport in a westerly direction. The altitudes varied between about 4,000 and 900 ft msl. Later, the pilot reestablished communication with ATC, reported he had lost visual contact with the airport, and requested an instrument approach to the destination airport. The controller then provided a sequence of heading and altitude assignments to vector the airplane onto the approach, but the pilot did not maintain these assignments, and the controller provided several corrections. The pilot expressed his inability to identify the initial approach fix (IAF) and asked the controller for the correct spelling. The radar target then climbed and subsequently entered a descending right turn at 2,500 ft msl and 180 knots ground speed near the IAF, before radar contact with the airplane was lost. Although a review of airplane maintenance records revealed that the airplane was overdue for several required inspections, examination of the wreckage revealed signatures consistent with both engines being at high power at impact, and no evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies were found that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the airplane's panel-mounted GPS, which the pilot was using to navigate the flight, revealed that the navigation and obstruction databases were expired. During a weather briefing before the flight, the pilot was warned of low ceilings and visibility. The weather conditions reported near the destination airport about the time of the accident also included low ceilings and visibilities. The restricted visibility conditions and the high likelihood of inadvertent entry into instrument meteorological conditions were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The flight's erratic track, which included altitude and directional changes inconsistent with progress toward the airport, were likely the result of spatial disorientation. After reestablishing contact with ATC and being cleared to conduct an instrument approach to the destination, the airplane's flight track indicated that the pilot was not adequately prepared to execute the controller's instructions. The pilot's subsequent loss of control was likely the result of spatial disorientation due to his increased workload and operational distractions associated with his attempts to configure his navigation radios or reference charts. Postaccident toxicological testing of samples obtained from the pilot revealed the presence of ethanol; however, it could not be determined what percentage was ingested or produced postmortem. The testing also revealed the presence of amphetamine, an opioid painkiller, two sedating antihistamines, and marijuana. Although blood level quantification of these medications and drugs could not be made from the samples provided, their combined effects would have directly impacted the pilot's decision-making and ability to fly the airplane, even if each individual substance was only present in small amounts. Based in the reported weather conditions at the time the pilot reported the airport in sight and canceled his IFR clearance, he likely was not in a position to have seen the destination airport even though he may have been flying between cloud layers or may have momentarily observed the ground. His decision to cancel his IFR clearance so far from the destination, in an area characterized by widespread low ceilings and reduced visibility, increased the pilot's exposure to the hazards those conditions posed to the successful completion of his flight. The pilot showed other lapses in judgment associated with conducting this flight at the operational, aircraft, and the personal level. For example, 1) the pilot did not appear to recognize the significance of widespread low ceilings and visibility along his route of flight and at his destination (nor did he file an alternate airport even though conditions warranted); 2) the accident airplane was being operated beyond mandatory inspection intervals; and 3) toxicological testing showed the pilot had taken a combination of multiple medications and drugs that would have likely been impairing and contraindicated for the safe operation of an airplane. The pilot's decision-making was likely affected by the medications and drugs.

August 16, 2015 5 Fatalities

E-Med Rescue 24

Cape Town Western Cape

On 15 August 2015 at 2351Z a Cessna 441 aeroplane, with two crew and a paramedic on board took off from Eros Airport (FYWE) on a medical evacuation flight with their intended final destination Cape Town International Airport (FACT). The aircraft landed at Oranjemund (FYOG) to pick up a male patient and his daughter. At 0206Z the aircraft departed from FYOG on a mercy flight to FACT. At 0343Z the aircraft made the first contact with FACT area and the aircraft was put under radar control. At 0355Z, area control advised the crew that there was a complete radar failure. The aircraft was on a descent to 6500 ft when approach advised them to prepare for a VOR approach for runway 19. At 0429Z, while on approach for landing at FACT, all contact was lost with the aircraft. At approximately 0556Z the aircraft’s wreckage was located approximately 8 nm to the north of FACT. All five occupants on board were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact and post impact fire. The investigation revealed the aircraft collided with terrain during instrument meteorological condition (IMC) conditions while on the VOR approach for Runway 19 at FACT. At the time the ILS was working, however the approach controller offered a VOR approach for separation with an outbound aircraft as the radar was unserviceable.

April 1, 2015 3 Fatalities

Private Mexican

Cañaote Cojedes

Crashed in unknown circumstances near Cañaote, State of Cojedes. The wreckage was found the following morning. The aircraft was destroyed, all three occupants were killed and a load of 999 kilos of cocaine was found among the debris.

February 4, 2015 1 Fatalities

Del Air Enterprises II

Denton Texas

The instrument-rated commercial pilot was approaching the destination airport after a cross country flight in night instrument meteorological conditions. According to radar track data and air traffic control communications, while receiving radar vectors to the final approach course, the pilot did not always immediately comply with assigned headings and, on several occasions, allowed the airplane to descend below assigned altitudes. According to airplane performance calculations based on radar track and GPS data, the pilot made an engine power reduction about 2.5 minutes before the accident as he maneuvered toward the final approach fix. Following the engine power reduction, the airplane's airspeed decreased from 162 to 75 knots calibrated airspeed, and the angle of attack increased from 2.7° to 14°. About 4 miles from the final approach fix, the airplane descended below the specified minimum altitude for that segment of the instrument approach. The tower controller subsequently alerted the pilot of the airplane's low altitude, and the pilot replied that he would climb. At the time of the altitude alert, the airplane was 500 ft below the specified minimum altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. According to airplane performance calculations, 5 seconds after the tower controller told the pilot to check his altitude, the pilot made an abrupt elevator-up input that further decreased airspeed, and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall. A witness saw the airplane abruptly transition from a straight-and-level flight attitude to a nose-down, steep left bank, vertical descent toward the ground, consistent with the stall. Additionally, a review of security camera footage established that the airplane had transitioned from a wings-level descent to a near vertical spiraling descent. A post accident examination of the airplane did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation during the accident flight. Although the pilot had monocular vision following a childhood injury that resulted in very limited vision in his left eye, he had passed a medical flight test and received a Statement of Demonstrated Ability. The pilot had flown for several decades with monocular vision and, as such, his lack of binocular depth perception likely did not impede his ability to monitor the cockpit instrumentation during the accident flight. The pilot had recently purchased the airplane, and records indicated that he had obtained make and model specific training about 1 month before the accident and had flown the airplane about 10 hours before the accident flight. The pilot's instrument proficiency and night currency could not be determined from the available records; therefore, it could not be determined whether a lack of recent instrument or night experience contributed to the pilot's difficulty in maintaining control of the airplane.

Bil Mar Foods

Battle Creek-Kellogg Field-Executive Michigan

After the pilot finished the preflight inspection in the hangar, the maintenance technician pulled the airplane out of the hangar and connected the auxiliary power cart to the airplane. Shortly thereafter, the pilot boarded the airplane and proceeded with the normal checklist. The pilot signaled to the maintenance technician to disconnect the power cart. The maintenance technician subsequently signaled that the pilot was clear to start the engines. After departure, the pilot noted a problem with the landing gear, and, after establishing that the tow bar was, most likely, still attached to the nosewheel, he diverted to a nearby airport for a precautionary landing. During the landing, the nose landing gear collapsed and the primary structure in the nose of the airplane was substantially damaged.

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Safety Profile

Reliability

Reliable

This rating is based on historical incident data and may not reflect current operational safety.